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On Science and
HERE are many definlitiom of science,
and these are commonly based on
literarv and social usage rather than on the
technical problem of &stinguish;ng different areas of scholarship. To evolve an
adeaualte definition we shall a t e m ~ tto
extract common elements from physics,
biology, chemistry, geology, and aistronomy, from those fields which are commonly called sciences. Any accep~ble
definition of science must be equally applicable to all of these, to all the natural
sciences. To speak in the usual meaapbr,
we shall mempt a "scienlrific" definimtion
of science.
All the natural sciences are organized
and systematic. Is system the chlaracteristic of science? The words "science" and
"scientific" are often used as though they
were synonymous with "system" and "systematic." Thus classi6a~timand orpanizaaion have been thought to gge&a~e
"Library Science." Ya chere are vast differences in the extent to which our mmotype sciences have beem systematized, as
related to their complexi~ies,alnd I think
there will be no disagreement with the
statemenlt tha't svstem is not a fundamental
aspect of science and thw system alone
cannot serve as a basis for definition. Organized knowledge is not of itself scientific
knowledge.
The natural sciences are empirical; their
instrumentation requires ingenuity, inventiveness, and craft, and this has fathered
another popular usage of "science." Boxing
has given way to boxing science; barbering
to barber science; the type shop has been
transformed iln att least one college to the
typography laboratory. No, d s b r y , in-
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ventiveness, and originality all describe a
broader arena than that of the natural
sciences, and not even systematic craft is
science.
Is there a method which characterizes
the sciemces? The so-called "scientific
me~hod" is generally thought to include
steps such as observation, induction, and
prediction. Ya the literature abounds
with definitions of the schitific method,
and their very multiplicity d~isclosesehat
there is no uniaue melthod bv which the
data and theor& of science ire -obtz;led,
and the sciendc method may be mare
aiccura~tely described as the mold into
which scientists cast their ~ublisherdpapers
than as the recipe for achieving knowledge. As Holmnl has said,
in formalizing
" an individual con~ributionfor ~ u b lication, lit is part of the game . . . to make
the resuks in retrospect appear neatly de.
rived from clear fundarmentails. .
Months of tortuous, wasteful effort mav
be hidden bhtind a few elegant
with the sequence of presented development running directly opplosite to the
actual chronology, to che confusion of
students and historians alike." That e h m
is no method common to the sciences becoma acuhelv evident when we observe
that t h geol&ia would be forced to predict future geologic structures in spite of
the disparity between geologic and human
time scales, that simple morphology, which
simply describes organisms but does not
aitcempt to generate new hws or predict
new facts. would be m unscientl%c aotivirtv
for the biob&, if we forced these stud&
to conform ;b the "scientific method'' in
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order to qualify for their claim to scientific status. We must reject the use of a
common metlhod as the basis for the definition of science, for it is now a truism &at
there is no method common to the natural
sciences. Systematized observa~tion,induction, and prediction do not charwterize
the sciences uniquely.
What then are the fundlamental characteristics which lure at the basis of uhe
actlivities of all the natural sciences and
without which they could not exist? The
most pertinent of these is the public character of scientific data. All "standard observers" properly situated must be capable
of identifying the "same" event and of
reporting it in the same way. As William
EarleZhas said, the
. . standa~rdobserver
I 'anyone,' anyone, (that is, whose senses
are sound and whose mind is not hallucinated." The empirical data of science must
be accessible to all. Since it is thege dlata
that all inductions muslt follow, and to
which all theories mus~tultimately return,
it is upon the public chaacter of the
nature of its data that any definition of
science must rest. At its empirical foundation science need not be logical, it need
not be mathematical, but als an irreducible
minimum, science must be public. This
stipulation is certainly not inclusive; all
public even'ts are not necessarily science.
Rather, the requirement that the data be
public is meant to be exclusive. No private
datum or collection of such data can be
said to conatiltute a science.
The data of the psychothwapist are
wholly private. There is onily one observer,
the patient himmsdf. The inner structure
of the mind is wholly privaite and is not
and can never be equally visible to all
"standard observers." At bewt, it is the
role of the therapist to help the observer
make and interpret his own observat'Ions.
What there is to see can be seen only by
rhe patient. A science of psychotherapy
is a logical impossibility. A similar problem is faced by the sociologis~twhose basic
datum is testimony. 'While testimony can
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be counted, no observer can say whether
the testimony is true, four the correlation
between an individual's t e s ~ i m n yand his
belief can be known only to tohe testator.
In so highly cbarged an area as sexual behavior, the assertion that even freely given
testimony is truly represenwtiw of past
experiences has been vigorously debated.
While it is generally recognized that the
collection of testimony is subject to such
criticism, there seems to be an underlying
and untestable belief in the social sciences
that the disparity between testimony and
truth is as o f ~ e npositive as negative, and
that on the average truth is attained. As
difficult as is the problem of relacing testimony to truth for the living, the same
problem for the dead is truly b s u l o u n t able. Chronicle is undeniably public a ~ d
is available to all historians, but imwrp'retative history in which untestified motives
are attributed to individuals, to groups,
and to entire nations centainly must lie
outside the pale of anything even metaphorically called "historical science." Similar objections pertain to claims of a "science of esthetic criticism," a "scientific
psychology of art or music." Some psychological research attempts to relate private
expe~ienceslike loudness or brightness to
public stimuli called sound intensity or
light intensity, and is subject to the same
challenge, thfat its data are nm public and
caninw be made public through testimony.
A second characteristic common to ohe
sciences is their subject matter. Their common subject is nature, a subjee matter
quite public and accessible to the stmdard
observer. Nature may be disturbed or
altered by th act of observ~tion, bug
never by the fact th'at man is the observer.
The organization of the sciences is in part
dbe to the genius of the scien&t, but in
hrger measure to the organization of nature itself. From the point of view of the
scientist the system~dc, logical, mathematical, predictable character of his subject is the sheerest accident. If nature ware
ianciful the scientist w0111d study its
fancy. But nature is not capricious and
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there is ample evidence presently available
that the consistency of nazure is expressible
in "natural law," that the descripoion of
the world is cumula~iveand continually
grows more accurate, for it is a relatively
stable nature that is studied by successive
observers. The phases of Venus discovered
by Galileo some three hundred years ago
are even better known today; the electron's
charge measured by Wlikan some fifty
years ago is considerably more accurately
known today.
While the non-public datum of the
social studies is clearly excluded from the
category of science, there remains a vast
body of material in which the dhta are
public. The student of eamomics deals
with caxloadings, market receipits, bank
deposits, and so on. Such studies are
founded on the proposition that lawful
behavior is characteristic of man and his
in~stitutions,and that only the you)& of
his enterprise is responible for che inability
of the scholar to display the analogues of
Newton's laws of motion. Yet it is an
empty argument that man has studied
man for a shorter time than he has studied
nacure. I h e scholar looks back upon a
history of his subject from which no significant natural law hats emerged and extrapolates to a future in wh~ichthe laws
of human behavior are propounded in
every textbook. There is an interesting
and subtle conflict between $he faith of
the socis1 scientist in an inflexibly lawful
behavior (which remains mly to be discovered), and the nature of the social
structure which he studies. Certainly there
could be no society if human behavior
were completely indeterminate, yet human
behavior as well determined as the trajectory of a rifle bullet makes a farce of such
vital social institutions as the judiciary.
Carried to its relentless conclusions the
concept of "scientifically" lawful human
behavior assumes a predestined future in
which there can be neither reward nor
punishment and in which the concept of
personal responsibility is a mockery.
What can be wrong with the use of the

ward "science" in the context of the social
studies? According ao RichfieldY3 the
question of the scientific status of psychoanalysis is important because of the eulogistic function or emotive significance of
the term "science." "It seem to be assumed that to question the scientific status
of an activity is equivalent to asking
whether ahat activity is desirable, reliable
or valid." For $he purposes of the present
discussion the question of value is t o be
divorced from the question of the scientific character of the social studies. There
can be no doubt thait the e d y of man is
worthy and desirable. Nor is she present
discussion to be interpreted as an assertion
thatt the social studies cannot be objective.
All subjects may be treated objectively,
the social studies, es,hetics, and religion
not excepted. In science the interpretation
of data, the formul~tionof concepts, the
vehemence w$th which an argument is
propounded are cwminly tainted with personal bias. Yet tlhe question of subjectivity
does not arise in the sciences, for all data
must ultimately reside in nature, not in
man. In fact, if the question of subjectivity
or objectilvity is a meaningful one in a
particular context, then chat context cannot appropriately be called science.
No, the objection to the application of
the word "scienceyyto the social studies
lies in the fact that in patterning themselves after the sciences the social studies
have tended to reject insighas which cannot
be expressed quantitatively and statistically. In some areas it seems co be considered unprofessional m study man in
ways which are not likely to yield tabular
data and graphs. Primary decisions as to
what research can be undertaken and
secondary decisions as to experimental design are distorted by a straitjacket of form
built from the specifications of an alien
scholarship. Within a11 of the social studies
there are conflicts between the "more scientific" and ahe "less scientific" schools,
and the worst epithet which can be applied
to another's work appears to be "unscien3.

J. Richfield,
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tific." In the light of the present &ussion such debates are pdcularly fruitless.
perhaps2anew symbol is needed, generated
from the content of the social studies, unit-

ing rather than dividing the studies of
ma~n, and avoiding the self-imposed
blinders which must be donned by the
socifal student turned social scientist.

